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York: Remedies

Remedies
by Kenneth H. York*
It is a curious circumstance that, although the sole purpose
of a lawsuit is to obtain redress of some sort, the remedial
aspects of cases are usually shunted to the back of the litigational bus from which they emerge belatedly, casually, and
somewhat rumpled. Anyone searching for illuminating bits
of remedial lore in California (or any other) advance sheets
must be prepared to rummage about among tag-end paragraphs of literally hundreds of civil cases from which such
interest as may originally have existed in parties, facts, controversy, strategy, or even style has long since been drained
away.
However, remedial considerations are sometimes so strong
that they push to the forefront. This is particularly true of
cases in which the claimant is afforded, or at least thinks the
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trend of judicial lawmaking is such that there is a chance
he may be afforded, a choice of substantive law (contract,
tort or restitutionary) causes of action based upon the facts
stated.
Since remedial problems range in appearance from tag-end
paragraphs to main themes, a discussion of court decisions is
forced to follow a similiar pattern. It may be tempting at
times to focus only upon the main themes, but remedial problems given lesser attention may be equally important, if only
to the client's bank account. Accordingly, this review and
analysis treats in varying length the remedial problems to
which the courts gave varying attention.
Choice of Tort or Contract-Remedial Consequences
In California in recent years, the remedial consequences of
being able to choose between a breach of contract or a tort approach has been most graphically presented in actions against
insurance companies. In last year's volume of this work!
a short review was made of those cases wherein a liability
insurer had failed to take advantage of the opportunity to
settle a third party claim within the policy limits, thereby
exposing the insured to judgment liability uncovered by insurance. As there noted, considerable latitude is given the
insured insofar as electing to treat the insurer's conduct as a
breach of con tract or a tort. 2
The lure of punitive damages undoubtedly induced the
plaintiff in Wetherbee v. United Insurance Co. of America3
to add a count in tort to a complaint for damages for breach
of a disability insurance contract. That this lure is a peculiarly attractive one may be deduced from the $500,000 exemplary damage award the jury added to $1,050 general
damages. On the surface, the wrongful repudiation of a
disability insurance contract appears to fall short of the egregious conduct of the liability insurer in declining to settle
1. See Cal Law-Trends and Deveolpmen!s 1967, at p. 285.
2. The important case, of course, is
Crisci v. Security Insurance Co., 66
38
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Cal.2d 425, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 426 P.2d
173 (1967).
3. 265 Cal. App.2d - , 71 Cal. Rptr.
764 (1968).
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within policy limits, but the defendant insurer in Wetherbee
made some collateral representations in writing to induce the
insured to withdraw a letter of cancellation. From the tenor
of these representations and the company's subsequent inconsistent conduct, the plaintiff was able to establish a tort (deceit) theory that the company had induced the plaintiff to
act with no intent to perform on its part. As for the $500,000
punitive damages, the plaintiff suffered a common and ironic
failure of too successful advocacy. The case was remanded
for retrial because the discrepancy between general and punitive damages suggested passion or prejudice. Parenthetically,
there might be a difference between general damages recoverable for breach of the insurance contract here and those allowable in tort, but it is useless to search the case because
counsel stipulated the same amount under either approach.
The supreme court in Reichert v. General Insurance Company of America 4 has somewhat blunted any thrust toward
what might have seemed the ultimate holding in Wetherbee,
that any nonperformance by an insurer could be both breach
of contract and tort. Reichert is a peculiarly subtle case, as
indicated by the inordinate time it was retained on the calendar for rehearing, the vacation of not one but two prior
opinions, and the obviously nonideological split in the final
four to three decision-all this attention on whether or not
demurrers without leave to amend were properly entered
against a second amended complaint. The relevant facts are
not complex. Plaintiff owned a motel allegedly valued at
$1,500,000 with a first trust deed of $850,000. Policies with
a combined coverage of $1,375,000 were issued by the 4 defendant insurance companies. Having sustained fire loss, the
plaintiff contended that lack of cash to meet his commitments
caused his bankruptcy and the loss of his motel. It may be
assumed that settlement of claims under the policies was
eventually reached among the insurers, the beneficiary of
the deed of trust and the trustee in bankruptcy,5 thereby dis4. 68 Cal.2d 822, 69 Cal. Rptr. 321,
442 P.2d 377 (1968). For further discussion of this case, see Seligson, INSURANCE in this volume.

5. See Kossian v. American National
Insurance Co .. 254 Cal. App.2d 647,
62 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1967).
CAL LAW 1969
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posing of plaintiff's claims for the insurance proceeds as such.
Plaintiff thought, nevertheless, that his consequential pecuniary injury of bankruptcy and loss of property was not adequately redressed; he was confronted with the problem of
asserting a separate personal claim that would not be included
among those which passed to the trustee in bankruptcy. His
first amended complaint set forth (1 ) 4 separate counts against
the 4 insurers for return of premiums (carefully avoiding
reference to the bankruptcy) and (2) 4 separate counts
against the 4 insurers for failure to adjust the fire loss promptly,
which conduct was in bad faith and constituted fraud and oppression resulting in bankruptcy and causing him to lose his
motel. After demurrers were sustained, the plaintiff added a
ninth count for bad faith against all defendants alleging that
there was an implied promise to adjust losses promptly and
fairly, and that contrary to such promise, settlement was not
undertaken, and that "[a]s the direct and proximate result
and failure to exercise . . . good faith, care, skill, or diligence for the protection of plaintiff's rights, which were entrusted by plaintiff to defendants for protection, and of the
defendants' breach of their trust obligations, plaintiff has
been damaged in the amount of $1,500,000 plus interest.,,6
It is apparent that plaintiff, by stating counts in quasicontract and counts for consequential damages only, conceded that the claim for general damages for breach of a
contract to pay money had passed to the trustee. It is equally
apparent that he tried to state not only a breach of contract
and breach of trust, but also some sort of independent, personal, non-transferable tort claim which could not be said to
have passed to the trustee in bankruptcy. Despite the further
amendments to his complaint, the court concluded that counts
5 through 9 were still basically contractual:
The embellishments added by the pleader, as for example,
that defendant "in doing all of the things as herein alleged, has done them deliberately, fraudulently and oppressively," and that defendant is "guilty of oppression
6. 68 Cal.2d at 828, 69 Cal. Rptr. at
323, 442 P.2d at 379.
40
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and fraud," aside from their obvious conclusionary character, do not derogate from the contractual character of
the pleading.7
Even the dissenting judges seemed to accept this proposition
and concentrated their attention on whether the complaint
stated a contractual claim which escaped transfer to the trustee
in bankruptcy. Hence, it is clear that California judges are
presently unwilling to allow a claimant to shift from breach
of contract to tort by mere epithets describing the quality of
the breach. Although a man who loses property by a bankruptcy traceable to a lack of funds, in turn occasioned by the
"bad faith" and "oppressive and fraudulent" breach of a contractual obligation of a fire insurer, would seemingly attract
as much sympathy as one who loses property as the result of
a judgment to which he is exposed by the failure of a liability insurer to pay what proves to be a valid claim, there
is a gap between the two situations that the courts as of now
prefer to maintain.
Lest the point be lost, it should be restated. Reichert is a
typical case in which the remedial desires necessarily dominated and shaped the entire substantive law aspects of the case,
rather than the contrary.
Equitable Remedies
In Personam Nature of Equitable Proceedings

The proposition that "equity acts in personam," which is
occasionally modified and sometimes derided, reasserted its
elemental nature in Rothschild v. Erda. s The suit was instituted by a special California administrator to quiet title to
securities belonging to a decedent. Although quiet title suits
7. 68 Cal.2d at 831, 69 Cal. Rptr.
at 325, 442 P.2d at 381. The district
court of appeal in one of the vacated
opinions [53 Cal. Rptr. 693 at 699
(1966)] put the matter this way: "Appellant apparently assumes in his argument that a contract obligation may be
converted into a tort liability by a

failure to perform promptly, accompanied by the wish to harass, vex and
annoy the other contracting part~'. The
great weight of authority is clearly
against this contention."
8. 258 Cal. App.2d 750, 66 Cal. Rptr.
209 (1968).
CAL LAW 1969
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have come to be regarded as purely in rem proceedings, the
outcome shows that this is not literally so. In the course of the
suit, the court issued an order granting a preliminary injunction
restraining a New York administrator of the same estate from
instituting in New York any proceedings relative to a claim of
title of the securities. Substituted service was made and the
New York administrator appeared specially. On appeal, the
injunction order was reversed as void for want of personal jurisdiction, since defendant did not reside in California at any
time as specified by Code of Civil Procedure section 417.

Enforcement of Equitable Decrees-Remedial Problems
T he "Void" Decree Problem

It is easily predictable that In re Berrl will become a much
cited opinion and will encourage collateral attacks on injunctive decrees. Though less predictable, it is still in the
realm of speculation that the decision may have a considerable
impact upon effective judicial control of group or mob (choose
your euphemism) conduct and upon many forms of personal
conduct over which equitable jurisdiction has of recent years
been assumed to exist. The case developed from an ex parte
temporary restraining order, issued at the instance of Sacramento County, to prohibit a threatened strike by the Sacramento Chapter of the Social Workers Union. Named were
certain officers, 750 individual John Does and 150 John Doe
assocIatIons. The order was issued pending a hearing on a
motion for a preliminary injunction, and read as follows:

That Defendants and each of them, their officers, agents,
servants, employees, representatives and members, and
all persons in active concert or participation with
them, or in concert among themselves, be restrained
and enjoined from doing directly or indirectly
by any means, method or device whatsoever any and all
of the following things:
9. 68 Cal.2d 137, 65 Cal. Rptr. 273,
436 P.2d 273 (1968). For further disclIssions of this case see Grodin, LABOR
42
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a. From ordering or continuing to order, or asking or
requesting, or otherwise inducing or attempting to induce any employee of the Plaintiff to cease work for or
not to work for the Plaintiff;
b. From intimidating, threatening, molesting or coercing
the Plaintiff or Plaintiff's agents, employees, suppliers,
contractors, guests or invitees;
c. From striking or engaging in a work stoppage or
other similar concerted activity against Plaintiff; and
d. From picketing, and from placing, stationing or maintaining, or causing any picket or pickets to be stationed
or maintained, and from causing, participating in or inducing others to participate in any demonstration or
demonstrations on any grounds, or that portion of any
private or public street which adjoins any grounds, or on
any sidewalk which is contiguous to any portion of any
private or public street which adjoins any grounds which
are owned, possessed or controlled by the Plaintiff and
on which are situated any building, buildings or structures
of any kind whatsoever which are occupied by Plaintiff
and in which employees of Plaintiff are assigned to
work.lo
Union attorneys counseled that the order suffered from constitutional defects and a strike with peaceful picketing began.
No attempt was made to obtain a modification of the t.r.o.
Arrests were made and charges of criminal contempt under
Penal Code section 166 (4) were filed against the petitioners
who were later released on bail pending trial. Thus a collateral rather than a direct attack was made on the order by
means of a writ of habeas corpus. The supreme court discerned numerous constitutional objections to the t.r.o., declared it void, and sustained the writ as a proper remedy for
attack, using the analogy that "a court is without jurisdiction
to subject a citizen to criminal prosecution for violation of an
unconstitutional state or ordinance."ll
10. 68 Cal.2d at 141-142, 65 Cal.
Rptr. at 276-277, 436 P.2d at 276-277.

11. 68 Cal.2d at 145, 65 Cal. Rptr.
at 279, 436 P.2d at 279.
CAL LAW 1969
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The basic proposition of the court that the deliberate violation of an equity decree, void on its face, will not subject
the violator to penalties for civil or criminal contempt is an
entirely acceptable rule as such. However, there may be
some element of overkill, because the way the conclusion was
reached could have a considerable bearing upon the effectiveness of injunctive remedies in California. Only a few of the
possible points for discussion will be here taken up.
In the first place, the opinion in Berry recognizes the distinction between void decrees and merely erroneous decrees,
which cannot be disregarded with impunity, pending a review to detect the error which is ultimately shown to appear.
Void decrees have commonly been regarded as those beyond
the power or primary jurisdiction of the court to enter because
of lack of jurisdiction over the parties or of the subject matter.
The problem of an occasional, flagrantly erroneous decree has
been resolved by simply allowing a collateral challenge because the decree grossly exceeds the court's equitable jurisdiction. Perhaps this standard approach would have dealt
adequately with t.r.o. in Berry-either on the assumption
that the subject matter jurisdiction of a trial court does not
extend to the issuance of decrees constitutionally invalid on
their face, or that at least such decrees are patently and grossly
in excess of equitable jurisdiction. In its desire to hold the
instant decree void, however, the supreme court chose to reiterate a previous holding which narrowed the concept of the
court's power (i.e., primary jurisdiction):
Speaking generally, any acts which exceed the defined
power of a court in any instance, whether that power be
defined by constitutional provision, express statutory
declaration, or rules developed by the courts and followed
under the doctrine stare decisis, are in excess of jurisdiction. 12
From the sense in which "jurisdiction" is used in the quotation, the concept expressed comes perilously close to running

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/5

12. Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, 17 Cal.2d 280, 109 P.2d 942, 132
A.L.R. 715 (1941). cited in 68 Cal.2d
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counter to the rule that erroneous decrees are not void. A
decree constitutionally objectionable on its face fits easily
within such a concept of want of power, but the concept would
unwisely characterize as void the inordinate number of California trial decisions that suspiciously depart from precedent.
Moreover, the posture of the supreme court that a departure
from "rules developed by the courts and followed under the
doctrine of stare decisis" exceeds jurisdiction and is thus void
may strike some of the legal profession as whimsical.
On a related "jurisdictional" point the opinion may have
gone further than necessary. The county advanced an argument based upon United States v. United Mine Workers/ 3 that
the superior court had the power to issue an order preserving
the status quo "while . . . in the process of determining the
substantial question of its authority to grant the injunctive
relief sought, and that the temporary restraining order, as expression of that power, was to be obeyed upon pain of contempt regardless of its constitutional validity as ultimately
determined."14 This argument seems amiss here because the
United Mine Workers' doctrine may be properly limited to
the situation where a court is recognized to have the power to
issue an injunction maintaining the status quo while it ascertains facts to determine whether the case is properly before it
(the familiar "jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction").
Since the attack on the order in In re Berry was upon the constitutional deficiency of its language, the question of invalidity
was entirely different. The opinion quite correctly distinguished the case of Signal Oil, etc. Co. v. Ashland Oil, etc.
Co. IS (which to some extent relied on United Mine Workers),
sustaining the power of a superior court to issue a t.r.o. that
enjoins acts in violation of an agreement subsequently held
to be void.
In view of the distinctions between Berry and United Mine
Workers, the Berry opinion's inclusion of a quotation from
Witkin regarding United Mine Workers-"Whatever be the
13. 330 U.S. 258, 91 L.Ed. 884, 67
S.Ct. 677 (1947).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969
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at 279-280, 436 P.2d at 279-280.
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extent to which federal courts apply this doctrine, it is not the
law in California"16-is gratuitous and may someday give reason for regret (particularly since the cases cited by Witkin
as authority do not bear directly on the point of United Mine
Workers).
The justification for the United M ine Workers' approach is
that it allows a court effectively to maintain the status quo
during a transitory phase of litigation and thus permits it to
handle in an orderly fashion genuine controversies over its
power, regardless of the ultimate decision. The point of
United M ine Workers is that orders issued for this purpose
are within the power of the court and are not void, at least in
respect to a citation for criminal contempt. It is wide of the
mark to assume that a compilation of quotes to the effect that
a violation of a void order will not support a contempt citation
somehow establishes a clear-cut rule in California contrary
to United Mine Workers.
There is indeed a recent case in California cited in neither
Berry nor by Witkin, that appears to conflict with the United
Mine Workers' approach. In First National Bank v. Superior
Court 17 the court issued a t.r.o. against a bank, enjoining it
from holding a sale under a deed of trust. The bank requested
dissolution of the order a short time before the scheduled
hour of sale. The court asked for a postponement of the sale to
allow it to dispose of other matters and review the bank's
authorities. The bank declined and the court refused to dissolve the order. After the sale the court held the bank in contempt and assessed a fine of $500. The appellate court annulled the fine because of a federal statute that "no injunction
shall be issued against a (national banking association)
. . . before final judgment in any . . . action . . . in
any state
court.,,18 The appellate court said that
since the order must fall, all contempt proceedings based on
its violation must fall with it. That the court was unhappy

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/5

16. 1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (1954),
p. 421.
17. 240 Cal. App.2d 109, 49 Cal.
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with this course of events is made plain by the following
language:
This decision is in no way critical of the trial judge. The
rule [federal statute] is little known in the California
practice and seems seldom resorted to by the many national banks of this state. It is difficult to understand
counsel's rejection of the judge's eminently reasonable
request for a two-hour postponement of sale to permit
review of petitioner's authorities. We are bound, however, by the federal statute barring interim injunctive
relief in all state courtS.19
There should be no inference that the appellate court was
consciously running counter to the United Mine Workers'
rationale, for it cited no authority whatsoever. In fact, the
policy reasons underlying United Mine Workers are not strongly presented here. Even in such a weak case, it obviously
struck the appellate court as not entirely fit that the order
of a trial judge to hold it a minute while he reads the book
should be void even though he reads the book accurately and
correctly concludes he is not empowered to proceed further.
Had there been a genuine dispute as to whether the bank
was a "national" bank or whether there was a "final" judgment, the problem in First National would have been much
closer to United Mine Workers.
The power to decide such underlying issues and to issue
orders maintaining the status quo on pain of contempt, while
they are being decided, should rest squarely on the necessity
for a responsible, effective, and fast litigational process, rather
than on "jurisdictional" irrelevancies.
As a matter of fact, the United Mine Workers' situation has
not really arisen in California; nor has its rationale been examined in the proper context. Until this happens it may be
advisable to downplay some recent dicta and consider the
question as still open. The power involved is inherently pro19. 240 Cal. App.2d at 111, 49 Cal.
Rptr. at 360.
CAL LAW 1969
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cedural-to be neither casually exercised nor casually rejected.
Turning now to the fundamental issue decided in In re
Berry, it must be noted that the supreme court assumed, at
least for purposes of the decision, that certain strike activities
by welfare workers could be properly enjoined, but nevertheless held the recited order, in each of its subparts, was infected with constitutional deficiencies-violation of First
Amendment guaranties, vagueness, and overbreadth-so per··
vasive as to preclude the application of the doctrine of severability.
When injunction decrees infringe First Amendment rights
alone, they might be salvaged by the device of a partial
supersedeas. 20 (In this situation appeal is not available inCalifornia.) Tests of unconstitutional vagueness and overbreadth, which have been applied to legislation and now apply
to certain equity decrees in California, create drafting problems of a broad dimension. Since a party is now permitted
collaterally to attack without taking steps directly to seek a
modification, it is impossible, as might be the case with a
state statute, to obtain a properly limiting interpretation rendering the decree constitutional. The problem of uncertainty,
apart from constitutional considerations, has always been a
major one, particularly in connection with mandatory elements in a decree. Now, even in negative decrees, as in
Berry, the drafter must keep an eye on a voluminous amount
of constitutional law cases involving statutes and ordinances.
He must do this with considerable attentiveness when handling
cases of personal and civil rights, cases with fluid situations,
and cases affected by considerable emotion. He must define
with specificity, but avoid overbreadth. He gets but one
chance. If he is wrong, the attempt is a nullity, and conduct
in defiance of the defective order escapes punishment, even
though properly controllable and obviously within the generally proscribed area.
Given these considerations, there may be greater hesitancy
20. Sacramento Newspaper Guild v.
Sacramento County Board of Super48
CAL LAW 1969
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to issue equity decrees in cases involving civil rights and personal conduct. It is a reminder that there is a residual
validity to equity's traditional hesitancy to depart from the
protection of only property rights-not because there might
be a deficiency in humaneness, but because the harsh equitable remedies are peculiarly unsuited to the detailed regulation of personal conduct among human beings.

Contempt-Civil or Criminal-Jury Trials
The distinction between civil and criminal contempts,
puzzling at best, is further obscured in California by reason
of statute. Contempt proceedings in this state may be pursuant to the Penal Code as in Berry or to the Code of Civil
Procedure sections 1209-1222. Section 1209 lists eleven acts
or omissions constituting contempt, ignores any traditional
classifications, and indiscriminately lumps violations of equity
decrees (civil contempt) with aberrant behavior in and out
of court. Section 1219 allows imprisonment for the omission
to perform an act which is still within one's power to perform,
thus providing for the usual method of civil contempt of
the disobedience of mandatory equity decrees. Otherwise
the procedure and penalties for all forms of contempt, under
the Code of Civil Procedure sections, including the disobedience of negative injunctions, are the same.
In a leading case,I the supreme court said:
The distinction between civil and criminal contempt is
important in the federal and some state courts because
there are procedural differences, particularly in the safeguards afforded the citee
[citation omitted]
. But in California the proceedings leading to
punishment for failure to obey a decree (criminal contempt) and to imprisonment until the omitted act is
performed (civil contempt) are exactly the same [citation omitted]. Although the sections which provide the
procedure for both kinds of contempt are in Part III
1. City of Culver City v. Superior
Court, 38 Ca1.2d 535, 241 P.2d 258
(1952).
4

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969

CAL LAW 1969

49

13

Remedies
Cal Law Trends and
Developments, Vol. 1969, Iss. 1 [1969], Art. 5

of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is entitled "Special
Proceedings of a Civil Nature," contempt proceedings
are said to be "criminal in nature" and those procedural
rights and safeguards which are appropriate to criminal
contempt proceedings are also afforded, in California,
to civil contempt proceedings.2
Relying on the foregoing, the court of appeals, second district,
division three, in Little v. Superior Court 3 annulled an order
adjudging a defendant in contempt for failure to obey a court
directive to sign consent to certain depositions. Conducting
the review (on certiorari) as though criminal procedural safeguards were required, the court found deficiencies as to specificity, intent, and quantum of proof.
Against this background one would expect a jury trial in
all contempt cases in this state, but two cases have held otherwise. In United Farm Workers Org. Comm. AFL-CIO V.
Superior Court,4 the defendants violated a negative injunction
with respect to picketing and were ordered to show cause
why they should not be held in contempt. The court of appeal,
fifth district, refused a writ of prohibition to prevent the hearing from proceeding without a jury. Citing three recent United
States Supreme Court decisions,5 the court held that the violation was civil, not criminal, and that no jury trial was constitutionally required.
A few days later in a routine civil case concerning a violation of a preliminary injunction,6 the court of appeal, second
district, third division (which decided the Little case, supra)
also cited the same three Supreme Court decisions and also
held there is no right to a jury trial in proceedings under Code
of Civil Procedure sections 1209-1222, but on the ground
2. 38 Cal.2d at 541, 241 P.2d at 261.
3. 260 Cal. App.2d 311, 67 Cal. Rptr.
77 (1968).
4. 265 Cal. App.2d - , 71 Cal. Rptr.
513 (1968).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/5
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6. Pacific Tel. and Tel. Co. v. SuperiorCourt, 265 Cal. App.2d - , 72
Cal. Rptr. 177 (1968).
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that the penalties imposed were so limited that the contempt
charged fell within the category of a petty offense.
Thus we can say that a defendant who violates an equity
decree in California is probably not entitled to a jury trial
if cited for contempt under sections 1209-1222, but we cannot yet with authority say why. In a sense, both appellate
courts are correct in their interpretation of the Supreme Court
decisions. The fifth district opinion is correct in saying that
those decisions held that no jury trial is constitutionally required for civil contempt and correct in saying that its case
is civil contempt as most courts (apart from California) would
view it. The second district opinion is correct in saying that
the Supreme Court cases hold that the Constitution does not
require a jury trial for petty criminal contempt cases, and the
opinion is therefore consistent with its view of California
precedent.
Support Orders-Contempt

Under merged procedure, equity decrees for the payment of
money are enforceable both through contempt (within limitations as to imprisonment for debt) and through means used
to collect ordinary legal judgments. Support orders are instances in point. In Lyon v. Superior Court,7 the supreme
court disagreed with the court of appeal and upheld a contempt
order against a father in arrears in his support payments. The
trial court's finding of an ability to pay, at least in part, was
considered enough to sustain the order: "Ability to comply
with an order does not necessarily mean the ability to fully
and completely comply."g The order in question did, however, contain a peculiar provision:
The Defendant, having been found guilty of contempt
of court on six counts . . . is hereby ordered to serve
five days in the County Jail on each count to run consecutively. The Court further orders that this contempt
7. 68 Cal.2d 446, 67 Cal. Rptr. 265,
439 P.2d 1 (1968).
8. Bailey v. Bailey, 77 S.Dak. 546,
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may be paid [italics added] by the payment of $100.00
for each five days to be served. 9
The court of appeal, which found the order in general to
be void for uncertainty, considered this provision to be meaningless, providing neither punishment under Code of Civil
Procedure section 1218 nor coercion under section 1219.10
The supreme court, however, gave meaning to the section by
interpreting the paid to mean "purged." Neither section 1218
nor section 1219 applies to the conditions whereby the defendant may purge himself of contempt.
In two other cases l l involving child support orders the
supreme court emphasized that, beyond contempt proceedings, no special advantages would accompany this type of
equity decree in California. Both cases derived from attempts,
in effect, to garnish county or city pension moneys due the
jUdgment debtors as retired employees, but the court held
that such funds were by statute exempt from execution, garnishment, attachment or other process of court without any
equitable exceptions as to child support decrees. In fact the
court in one case felt so strongly about it that it held the
trial court had no power to issue the order and allowed the
peremptory writ of mandamus in lieu of appeal. 12

Equity Power-Setting Aside Default Judgments
Conflicting opinions were written by the second and fifth
district courts of appeal as to whether the municipal court
has the power to set aside a default judgment because of
extrinsic fraud or mistake upon a motion made six months
after the default. According to the fifth district opinion,13 a
separate equity suit in the superior court is required. The
9. 68 Cal.2d at 449, 67 Cal. Rptr. at
267, 439 P.2d at 3.
10. See Lyon v. Superior Court, 64
Cal. Rptr. 357 (1967).
11. Ogle v. Heim, 69 Cal.2d 7, 69
Cal. Rptr. 579, 442 P.2d 659 (1968);
Miller v. Superior Court, 69 Cal.2d 14,
69 Cal. Rptr. 583, 442 P.2d 663 (1968).
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12. Miller v. Superior Court, 69 Cal.
2d 14. 69 Cal. Rptr. 583. 442 P.2d 663
(1968).
13. Strachan v. American Insurance
Co., 260 Cal. App.2d 113, 66 Cal. Rptr.
742 (1968).
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second district in a later case14 pointedly disagreed. The
supreme court, however, ultimately has sided with the fifth
district position.
Default judgments in the superior court entered under the
same circumstances may be alternatively attacked by motion I5
or by a separate suit in equity.16 The relief granted by way
of motion has usually been justified as within the "inherent
equity power" of the superior court. There has been little
question that default judgments entered in the municipal court
may be avoided for extrinsic fraud or mistake in a separate
equity suit filed in the superior court. 17 But does the municipal court have the power to accomplish the same result by
motion? The Strachan case (5th district) held no, because
the equitable relief requested was not within the subject matter jurisdiction (power) of the municipal court as outlined in
section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, although it was
conceded that otherwise the matter was one which could be
practically handled by the municipal court. The Bloniarz
case (2d district), after noting the incongruity which arises
if in matters over $5000 relief from default may be had by
motion, but for matters less than $5000 a separate suit in
equity in a different court is required, held that the municipal
court has the inherent power to settle the matter on a motion
to set aside the default, even after a six-month lapse.
The difficulty arises from a language trap. The superior
court's power to set aside defaults on motion has been habitually described as an "inherent equity power." To confer
the same power by court decision on the municipal court
does indeed seem to be a judicial extension of its subject
14. Bloniarz v. Roloson, 263 A.C.A.
139.69 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1968). (Opinion
later vacated, see 70 Cal.2d - , 74 Cal.
Rptr. 285, 449 P.2d 221 (1969).)
15. E.g., Palmer v. Moore, 266 Cal.
App.2d - , 71 Cal. Rptr. 801 (1968);
Sullivan v. Sullivan, 256 Cal. App.2d
301, 64 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1967); Orange
Empire National Bank v. Kirk, 259
Cal. App.2d 347, 66 Cal. Rptr. 240
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(1968) (attorney's misconduct rather
than fraud or mistake).
16. E.g., Higley v. Bank of Downey,
260 Cal. App.2d 640, 67 Cal. Rptr.
365 (1968); Hayes v. Rich, 255 Cal.
App.2d 613, 64 Cal. Rptr. 36 (1967)
(this opinion states the attack is direct,
although in fact it should probably be
called collateral).
17. See Bernath v. Wilson, 149 Cal.
App.2d 831, 309 P.2d 87 (1957).
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matter jurisdiction relative to equity causes beyond that allowed by the legislature. The court of appeal's opinion in
Bloniarz need not, however, be so interpreted. The power
to avoid its own default judgments at any time for fraud or
mistake, provided there is a proper hearing, can be regarded
as inherent without necessarily saying it is equitable-governed by equitable principles, yes.
The supreme court disagreed with the court of appeal in
B loniarz 18 (as well as with the comments which have just been
made), stating that the power to set aside a default judgment for extrinsic fraud or mistake is "distinct from the
power to amend and correct records"19 as conferred on all
courts by Code of Civil Procedure section 128. According
to the court, the first power is equitable and inheres in only
courts of general jurisdiction; the second power is primarily
administrative and inheres in all courts of record.
It is arguable that the inherent power of a municipal court
is controlled solely by section 128. That section merely defines a court's incidental powers. The power to set aside a
default judgment inheres in the powers conferred on the
municipal court by section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
To resolve the conflicting interpretations in favor of a municipal court exercising such a power, an amendment to section
89 should be made.
Ancillary Equitable
Status Quo

Remedies-Maintaining

The usual diverse problems in
orders of a discretionary nature
with no striking developments.
v. KatlO a temporary injunction
easement came under scrutiny.
some documentary evidence had
the supreme court sustained the
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framing suitable temporary
were encountered in 1968
In Continental Baking Co.
against interfering with an
Although it appeared that
been improperly admitted,
injunction. The exclusion

20. 68 Cal.2d 512, 67 Cal. Rptr. 761,
439 P.2d 889 (1968).

18

York: Remedies

Remedies

of such evidence may have weakened the probability of the
plaintiff's ultimate success, but the issue of relative hardship,
weighted in plaintiff's favor, was not affected.
That the court may be in for a lengthy period of supervision
of temporary injunctions where personality factors dominate
litigation was again illustrated in Jones v. Fakehany.l Dr.
Fakehany founded the Highland Medical Clinic a quarter of
a century ago. His death triggered a dispute between his
widow and his former medical associate, who instituted proceedings in 1966 for liquidation of their partnership. Skirmishes for physical control of the premises, for the possession
of records, and for the clinic's patients led to a series of
court orders attempting to keep this knotty complex of problems beyond disentanglement. Two years later the court
of appeal in the cited case was called upon to consider modification of an order containing several directives. The court
deemed it inadvisable to formulate a "final" order even after
this length of time, gave some sage advice, and remanded
with directions to modify pursuant to the advice.
The difference between a conservatorship and a receivership
was stated as follows in Hillman v. Stults,2 wherein a convict
sought protection of his property: "A receiver is a neutral
court official while a conservator is a representative of a
party."3 Since an equity court has inherent power to appoint
a receiver, it may, when proper, do so without duplication,
in a case where a conservatorship exists. Although it mentioned a trial of title, the court held that the case was basically
no more than an equity suit to establish and enforce an express trust, so no right to a jury trial existed.
Declaratory Judgments

Last year's article on remedies demonstrated that the declaratory judgment as a test for the constitutionality of penal
ordinances is often treated erratically by the courts. One
1.
810
2.
295

261 Cal. App.2d 298, 67 Cal. Rptr.
(1968).
263 Cal. App.2d 848. 70 Cal. Rptr.
(1968).

3. 263 Cal. App.2d at 875, 70 Cal.
R ptf. at 31 I.
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justification for such treatment was offered this year by Holden
v. Arnebergh. 4
Plaintiffs, in the business of selling books, were arrested for
selling obscene material. They brought an action for declaratory relief and for an injunction against the city attorney.
The trial court sustained demurrers to the plaintiff's complaint.
The court of appeal, second district, affirmed the judgment
on the pleading.
Plaintiff advanced two arguments on appeal: (1) that the
officers were required to obtain warrants prior to the arrest
and seizure and (2) that "it is now settled that an action
for declaratory judgment will lie to determine the alleged
obscenity of a book or other material."5 The court rejected
the first argument on the ground that the plaintiffs had an
adequate remedy at law by virtue of sections 1539 and 1540
of the Penal Code. That there was an adequate remedy at
law also met the plaintiff's second contention-this time, by
virtue of a timely motion to suppress that "might well have
removed the several materials from judicial consideration,
thus ending the People's case."6
Contrasted to Holden is Landau v. Fording,7 in which the
court of appeal, first district, assumed the plaintiffs had access
to declaratory relief, although it did decide that the material
was obscene and thus denied relief. But Holden is distinguishable from Landau in that the plaintiff in Landau had not been
arrested prior to bringing the action. This distinction justifiably controlled the different results in the two cases.
Remedies for Injuries to Tangible Property Interests8

Real Property-Remedies to Determine Title or Possession
A quiet title suit, being equitable, is subject to the defense
4. 265 Cal. App.2d - , 41 Cal. Rptr.
40 I (1968).
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Rptr. at 403.
6. 265 Cal. App.2d at - , 71 Cal.
Rptr. at 404.
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Rptr. 177 (1966), affirmed memorandum, 388 U.S. 456, 18 L.Ed.2d 1317,
87 S.C!. 2109 (1967).
8. Heretofore discussion has been
primarily limited to procedural consid-
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of laches, but the very nature of the suit, i.e., to obtain a
declaration of status, makes the defense rarely applicable. As
pointed out in Gerhard v. Stephens 9 the party asserting the
defense must demonstrate that he was in adverse possession
of the contested property during the period of delay.
Recovery of possession by a landlord generally takes the
form of summary proceedings in unlawful detainer. Statutory treble damages totaling $32,000, plus attorney's fees
(as provided under the lease) were awarded in Erbe Corp.
v. W & B Realty Co. 10 despite the unusual fact that the
defendants had relinquished physical possession before trial,
without conceding their lack of right to possession.
-Damages for Trespass

Confusion exists about the meaning of the expression "mitigation of damages" because of the tendency to use it to
describe disparate concepts and also to speak unnecessarily
of a "duty" to mitigate. The defendant in a defamation case,
for example, may "mitigate" damages by publishing a retraction. The same defendant might also seek to introduce evidence in "mitigation" by showing the plaintiff had no reputation to destroy. The plaintiff cannot recover for damages
which he could reasonably limit, and this too is referred to
as "mitigation," although it can be more cogently described
as "the doctrine of avoidable consequences."
There is some discussion on this point in Green v. Smith;l1
the court made unmistakably clear the nature and application
of the avoidable consequences rule, even though it did lapse
into using the broad term "mitigation." In Green the defendant intentionally (but not maliciously) broke a concrete irrigation pipeline supplying plaintiff's nursery for ornamental
trees which were approaching harvest. Plaintiff attempted
erations in pursuit of the proper remedy. The article now turns to a discussion of remedies in context of substantive law.
9. 68 Cal.2d 864, 69 Cal. Rptr. 612,
442 P.2d 692 (1968). For further dis-

cussion of this case, see Friedenthal,
CIVIL PROCEDURE in this volume.
10. 255 Cal. App.2d 773, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 462 (1967).
11. 261 Cal. App.2d 392, 67 Cal.
Rptr. 796 (1968).
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to irrigate by constructing ditches; his first attempt failed and
the second saved nineteen rows of trees. Twenty-five rows,
worth $17,000, were lost. In a nonjury trial it was found
that by expending $600 plaintiff could have brought in water
by renting portable equipment or by running a line to a fire
hydrant. Hence, damages were held limited to $600. The
appellate court reversed on the matter of damages. The
plaintiff, of course, could not recover damages he could reasonably have avoided by an expenditure not "disproportionate
to the loss sought to be avoided."12 At first glance, an
expenditure of $600 to save $17 ,000 would not seem disproportionate or unreasonable. However, the appellate court
correctly pointed out that the reasonableness of the plaintiff's
actions is not to be judged by hindsight or by standards applicable to a genuine "duty" which might be invoked in other
areas of the law. Confronted with an emergency, the plaintiff
took measures to avoid the consequences of defendant's intentional wrong. That other measures would later seem more
rational does not control the reasonableness of conduct which
satisfies the legal requirements of "avoidance of consequences."
-

Encroachments and Nuisances

The legal remedy of self help plus damages was held preferable to the equitable mandatory injunction in a somewhat
unusual encroachment case, City of Berkeley v. Gordon. ls
The city, while reconstructing a street, encountered a basement built 65 years previously, extending from defendant's
building into the street area. Since there was no impairment
of normal street usage, and there was an inference of consent
by the city, the basement was held to be merely an encroachment rather than a public nuisance, abatable under California
Civil Code section 3491. Although other factors also justified the discretionary denial of equitable relief in favor of
damages, the fact that the plaintiff had the requisite equipment
on the site, plus the difficulties inherent in supervising mandatory construction decrees, alone warranted the denial.
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A court that has undertaken equitable control of a public
nuisance may properly issue injunctions against the bringing
of further private nuisance suits to prevent impairment of its
orders and to avoid conflicting regulations and vexatious litigation. So held Rynsburger v. Fertilizer Co-op, Inc. 14 Such
an injunction is no more than a modern example of the historic equity bill of peace. A side issue of laches was raised
in Rynsburger because the private suit had been allowed to
proceed to the point where a trial date had been set before
the injunction was sought; but the defense was rejected
on the ground that the delay was insignificant in point of
time.
Competition between two adjacent enterprises offering food,
drink, gas, etc. along a frontage road to Highway 99 in Tulare
County had escalated to the point of erection of spite fences,
diversionary road signs, and other harassing devices, and the
court held such activities to be a nuisance warranting an
injunction, plus damages reflected by loss of profits in Hutcherson v. Alexander.15 Since both plaintiff's and defendant's
businesses were relatively new and had been established within
a few weeks of each other, the problem of determining lost
profits was, as is frequently the case/6 a difficult one. The
trial court adopted the device of issuing the injunction and
then retaining jurisdiction to determine damages based on
further experience in the operation of the business. The
appellate court, however, disapproved of this remedial technique. While agreeing that an equity court after issuing an
injunction may retain jurisdiction to later modify the decree,
it held that in bifurcated cases, the damage issue should not
be similarly held back pending developments. If the determination of lost profits at trial is merely difficult, the court
should do the best it can; if too speculative, the court should
award only nominal damages.
14. 266 Cal. App.2d - , 72 Cal. Rptr.
102 (1968).
15. 264 Cal. App.2d - , 70 Cal. Rptr.
366 (1968).
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Personal Property-Specific Restitution
Claim and delivery is a statutory provisional remedy invocable when chattels are wrongfully withheld. A procedural
point was clarified as to this remedy in American Machine
& Foundry Co. v. Pitchess. 17 Code of Civil Procedure section
509 allows the plaintiff (subject to procedures not here relevant) "at any time before answer, to claim the delivery" of
his property (emphasis added). The plaintiff had delivered
the necessary papers to the sheriff, but the sheriff had not
picked up the property before the defendant filed an answer.
The court held that plaintiff had "claimed" the property within the meaning of the statute and issued a mandamus to the
sheriff.
Excessive Attachments of Property-Abuse of Process
and Malicious Prosecution-Measure of Damages
In Templeton Feed and Grain v. Ralston Purina Co. IS the
defendant attached a flock of turkeys in the possession of a
grower purportedly by virtue of rights to after-acquired property under a chattel mortgage. The turkeys were actually
the property of the plaintiff under separate financing arrangements. To secure the release of the turkeys, plaintiff paid
$60,738.56, the amount of the grower's debt to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff filed a tort claim for abuse of process, and added
a common count in assumpsit that indicated a remedial theory
of legal restitution of moneys paid under duress. (The court
of appeal properly rejected the ancient contention that the
addition of an assumpsit count "waived" the other counts
in the complaint.) The plaintiff requested submission of a
punitive damages issue to the jury, but the trial court refused
the request. However, an issue of mental anguish was allowed to go to the jury, which then returned a verdict of
nearly $111,000. The trial court thereafter issued a condi-
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Rptr. 814 (1968).
18. 62 CaL Rptr. 169 (1967) a court
of appeal opinion vacated by 69 Cal.2d
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tional order for a new trial unless plaintiff consented to a
reduction to $67,000. The plaintiff consented and defendant
appealed.
At this point the judgment still included an item of
$6,261.44 more than out-of-pocket expenditures that could be
attributed to only mental anguish. But both the supreme court
and the court of appeal pointed out that the plaintiff as a
corporation could not sustain mental anguish. At the same
time, both agreed that it was erroneous to exclude the issue
of punitive damages from the jury. Nevertheless, by electing
to accept $67,000 the plaintiff had arguably foregone an
award of punitive damages. Should the case be unconditionally remanded for a new trial on the damage issue? The
court of appeal decided remand unnecessary if defendant
would consent to the judgment for $67,000. Otherwise, a
new trial would be ordered on all amounts above $60,738.56,
and the defendant would assume the risk of having the punitive damage issue submitted to the jury. The supreme court,
allowing the defendant no such option, reversed for a new
trial on the entire damage issue, both compensatory and
punitive, and vacated the intermediate court's opinion.
A side issue in Templeton Feed relates to the effect of
plaintiff acting on advice of counsel. It was noted in the
court of appeal opinion that outside of California this point
has been considered as evidence in mitigation of damages,
but not as a defense to the action. In California the point
arose in a malicious prosecution case19 where action on advice
of counsel was held to be a defense to the action as long
as all facts are fully disclosed to the attorney. Assuming,
without deciding, that this holding applies to abuse of process,
the court in Templeton disposed of the problem by simply
observing that the record did not sustain the defense as stated.
There the matter rests.
The use of the declaratory relief technique in an action
for malicious prosecution is hardly to be expected, but this
remedy was appropriately applied in Munson v. Linnick. 20
19. Moore v. Durrer, 127 Cal. App.
759, 16 P.2d 676 (1932).
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One substantive requirement for this tort is the termination
of the so-called "prosecution" favorable to the person later
seeking redress. In the Munson case, part of the pattern of
malicious prosecution charged against defendant, a lawyer,
was the violation of a tacit agreement with opposing counsel
not to take a default in the highly questionable action that
he, the defendant, had initiated. Defendant, however, not
only caused a default to be entered, but also allowed a year
to pass before taking action to enforce the judgment, thus
precluding a motion to set aside under section 473 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. Levy and execution on the plaintiff's property was then obtained.
Plaintiff filed the present action to set aside the default
judgment, to recover the proceeds of the levy plus punitive
damages, and to obtain a declaration of rights in the premises.
Treated as an action for malicious prosecution, the point was
made that, at the time the suit for declaratory relief was filed,
the default judgment was technically still in effect, so the
"prosecution" could not be said to have yet ended favorably
to the plaintiff. The declaratory judgment suit, however, is
equitable in nature and a court of equity can make a complete determination of the controversy according to the facts
as they exist at the time of the decree. An award composed
of the amount taken under the wrongful judgment plus interest, expenses, and punitive damages, may properly be made
as an incident of the declaratory relief action.
The remedy for excessive attachment where the underlying
proceedings are valid is an action for abuse of process rather
than an action for malicious prosecution, which is proper when
the attachment is pursuant to an underlying action maliciously
instituted without proper cause. So held the supreme court
in White Lighting v. Wolfson. 1 In the normal situation,
therefore, the claim arising from excessive attachment may
be asserted in the primary action itself.
1. 68 Cal.2d 336, 66 Cal. Rptr. 697,
438 P.2d 345 (1968).
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Money-Diversion of Proceeds of Insurance Policies

In Cramer v. Biddison 2 the court of appeal in a two-to-one
decision found appropriate grounds for a constructive trust
on insurance proceeds, but then proceeded to nullify the practical reasons for doing so. As part of a divorce settlement,
the husband had agreed to carry insurance policies amounting
to $45,000 payable to the wife but specifically for the protection of the children during minority. The husband, without
the wife's knowledge or consent, had changed the beneficiary
on all but $12,000 of the policies to his estate. He died before
the children reached majority. The executors received the
moneys, and after receiving notice of the wife's claim under
the contract paid creditors' claims with the proceeds. In
this suit by the wife against the executors, the majority recognized the propriety of a constructive trust amounting to
$3,000 and conceded the rule that property not properly
part of the decedent's estate should not be applied to the
decedent's debts. However, the majority thought the executors could, with impunity, treat the alleged trust funds as
an asset until judicially determined otherwise. Their conclusion seems contrary to comment (b) of section 178 of the
Restatement of Restitution.
"What were the executors supposed to do between the notification by [the wife] that she claimed the proceeds and the
bringing of her action to enforce her claim [a period of two
years]?,,3 was the rhetorical proposition of the majority. The
dissenting judge answered readily, "The executors would have
been well advised . . . to have filed in the probate proceedings a petition for instructions."4 Interpleader might
also have been an answer.
2. 257 Cal. App.2d 720, 65 Cal. Rptr.
624 (1968).
3. 257 Cal. App.2d at 727, 65 Cal.
Rptr. at 628.

4. 257 Cal. App.2d at 729, 65 Cal.
Rptr. at 629.
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Remedies for Injuries to Intangible Property Interests
Security Interests-Damages
The measure of damages for negligently causing the loss
of a security interest accompanying a promissory note is
obviously the difference in value between a secured and unsecured note. For purposes of computation, what is the value
of a real property purchase money note in California, given
the effect of the anti-deficiency statute?5 In Howe v. City
Title Insurance Co. s the plaintiff had a junior trust deed
secured by such a note. However, the note was guaranteed.
The defendant negligently failed to record a request for notice
of default and sale under a prior trust deed, with the result
that plaintiff's security interest was wiped out on foreclosure
since he was denied an opportunity to cure the default. The
property was sufficiently valuable to cover the plaintiff's junior
lien, so the secured value of the note was its face value. The
unsecured note was deemed valueless because of the antideficiency statute, despite the guaranty. The court pointed
out that the guarantor and his wife were having trouble meeting payments on two other trust deeds and that the guarantor
had an unsatisfied judgment for $6,000 against him outstanding. This evidence sufficed to establish uncollectibi1ity without the necessity of suing on the guaranty to establish damages. 7

Business Interests-Trade Secrets and Trade Names
The cases decided in 1968 added little that is worthy of
extensive note on the protection of interests in trade secrets and
names, afforded by either equity decrees or damages. In King
v. Pacific Vitamin Corp.s equitable relief against a wholesale
drug salesman and a competing employer who hired him
from plaintiff's employ was denied because the salesman's
5. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 580b.
6. 255 Cal. App.2d 85, 63 Cal. Rptr.
119 (1967).
7. For a discussion of restitutionary
considerations in respect to security in64
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activities did not rise to the level of protectibility encompassed
by the so-called "route" cases in which employees operate
routes for customers whom they supply with such things as
laundry and linens, ice, bread, milk. In Diodes, Inc. v.
Franzen,9 demurrers to the third amended complaint were
sustained for inadequate pleading; the plaintiff was unable
to state other than conclusionary facts concerning alleged
"secret processes" or to aver with particularity special damages, in the nature of loss of profits or goodwill (or the casual
connection between defendant's conduct and plaintiff's loss),
sufficient to support a count of unfair competition.
The court of appeaFo reversed a trial court decision granting
equitable protection to the name "Look" on a magazine-the
defendant was publishing a magazine called Nude Look-because the established facts did not indicate consumer confusion. Apart from the economic aspects, it is difficult to
say whether the plaintiff publishers should be flattered or
unflattered by the bit of modern social commentary implicit in
this decision.
Remedies for Wrongful Death

The mitigating effect of the remarriage of a widow on
whose behalf a wrongful death action has been brought was
raised in two cases in 1968, Cherrigan v. City and County of
San Francisco ll and Barth v. B. F. Goodrich CO. 12 In both,
evidence of the remarriage was held to be properly excluded,
and in Cherrigan it was further held that the widow could not
be compelled to amend her complaint so as to reveal her current married name. Also in Cherrigan, that the co-plaintiff,
a minor child, was conceived before marriage was also withheld from the jury. The unfavorable attitude toward this
type of mitigating evidence stems from Benwell v. Dean. 13
9. 260 Cal. App.2d 244, 67 Cal. Rptr.
19 (1968).
10. Cowles Magazine & Broadcasting, Inc. v. Elysium, Inc., 255 Cal. App.
2d 731, 63 Cal. Rptr. 507 (1967).
11. 262 Cal. App.2d 643, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 42 (1968).
5
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Any distinction between the "possibility" and the "fact" of the
widow's remarriage is openly rejected in California. The
rationale is that the evidence is speculative in either case and
the evidence of actual remarriage removes speculation only as
to the event and not as to the mitigating consequences. However, the court in Cherrigan tolerated the testimony of a professional sociologist in response to hypothetical questions regarding the probable success or failure of the plaintiff's
marriage to the decedent, taking into consideration such
factors as age, length of acquaintance, disparity of religious
faith, premarital sexual relations, stability of parents' marriages. The estimated failure rate according to this witness
was 25 percent in the United States, 50 percent in California,
and 70 percent in Marin County. To a layman, it might appear unrealistic to regard the projections of a sociologist as to
the future success of an abruptly terminated 35-day marriage
as less speculative, relative to the pecuniary loss to the widow,
than the uncontrovertible fact of her present remarriage.
Perhaps it would be more logical to consider the California
exclusionary rule of the widow's remarriage as simply an application of the "collateral source" rule of tort damages in a
wrongful death case. As a sidelight, the defendant in Cherrigan presented an affidavit by a juror that the sum awarded
had not been discounted to present value, but the court refused to permit the verdict to be impeached in this fashion.
Barth makes it clear that a product liability case falls under
the terms of the California wrongful death statute. The point
is important in respect to the defense of contributory negligence. Although liability based purely on contract has been
held not to support a wrongful death action,14 it has been
recognized for some years that liability for breach of warranty
is covered by this state's wrongful death act. 15 Some authority
to the contrary exists elsewhere, but the Barth holding as to
strict liability of manufacturers is in accord with the recognized
trend.
14. Moxon v. Kern County, 233 Cal.
App.2d 393, 43 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1965).
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Remedies for Deception

Deceit-Damages

The "out of pocket" rule measuring damages for deceit
(section 3343 of the Civil Code) was applied in Ach v. Finkelstein 16 in such a way as to display the inherent unwieldiness
of the computation of damages under that rule-it is even
worse under the "benefit of the bargain" rule-when the transaction involves large total sums as compared to the amount
of damage actually resulting. The plaintiffs paid $350,000
for rental properties, being given the false impression that the
units were under 12-month leases, whereas in fact rental
concessions had been granted. As a practical matter this
compelled further concessions reducing anticipated income.
To apply the out-of-pocket rule it was deemed necessary to
determine the actual value of the apartment house. Various
appraisals were introduced in evidence. One defendant said
$374,650; another, about $370,000. One of defendant's
experts estimated $360,000. A second gave $346,500 to
$356,500 on a market data and comparative approach. He
also stated $337,960 on an income evaluation approach and
the fair market value approach. Plaintiffs' expert appraised
the property at $275,000 on the market data approach,
$278,750 on the cost approach, and $273,500 on the income
approach. The trial court, without a jury, decided on
$340,000, an amount to which no one had testified, and
awarded $10,000 damages, which was affirmed on appeal.
The case illustrates how pointless it is to require a jury or
judge to wrestle with wildly discrepant estimates amounting to
over a third of a million dollars, when the true focus should
be the deficiencies in represented income, amounting to but a
relatively few thousand dollars.
Fraud-Rescission-A llowable Delay

In Wilke v. Coinway, Inc.17 plaintiffs were induced by misrepresentations of income potential to purchase some coin16. 264 Cal. App.2d -,70 Cal. Rptr.
472 (1968).
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operated machines intended to test the operator's reflexes.
One of the defendant's contentions was that the plaintiffs'
reaction time was a bit slow insofar as rescission requirements
are concerned. It took five months before the lack of income
potential was discovered, four months before an attorney
was consulted, and another month before action was taken.
The plaintiffs' delay was held not to be undue since there was
no indication of prejudice. Plaintiffs' case was bolstered by
the recognition of their inexperience and credulity. In passing
it might be pointed out that whether or not the defendant is
prejudiced by the delay is only one factor; the other concerns
whether the delay is, in fact, an election by plaintiffs to affirm.
Fraud in Secured Land Sale Transactions-The Relevance of the Anti-Deficiency Statutes to the Remedy
A way may exist around the provisions of section 580d of
the Code of Civil Procedure barring a deficiency judgment on
a secured note after a private sale of the property at which the
security holder purchased. The way, given the requisite supporting evidence, is to rescind the promissory note for the
borrower's fraudulent representations of the nature or value of
the security. IS Thus the lender may recover the full amount
of the loan on a restitutionary theory, plus consequential damages which include prior litigation expenses including attorney's fees. Likewise, the single action statute is no bar.
A more perplexing situation confronted the defrauded lender
in American Savings and Loan Assoc. v. Leeds. l9 Here the
lender advanced $85,000, secured by a trust deed, against the
purchase price of $122,500 of a house falsely represented by
the seller to be on unfilled ground. Both the lender and buyer
were victims of the fraud. The house collapsed. The security
was deemed worthless or close to it.
The buyer sued the seller and reached a settlement for an
unknown sum; the lender was excluded from these negotiations. The lender thereupon brought the present action to
recover the entire amount of the purchase money loan and to
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18. See Kass v. Weber, 261 Cal. App.
2d 417, 67 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1968).
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subject to a trust in its favor the moneys (whatever sum this
might be) rebated by the seller to the defendant-buyer. (The
seller was originally made a party, but disappeared from the
proceedings-probably to reappear in separate litigation.)
Plaintiff relied on provisions in the trust deed that the defendant "keep the property in good condition and repair" and
give the lender a right to any award for physical damage
to the property. A demurrer was sustained by the trial court
whose ruling was upheld at all appellate levels. The reasoning was that the provisions in the trust deed with respect to
repair were applicable only to damage to the property after
the loan was consummated, rather than to this situation, where
the security was inadequate at the time the loan was made.
The anti-deficiency statute 20 precludes shifting the loss of the
inadequate security to the buyer under these circumstances
by prohibiting his being compelled to pay over sums recovered
in settlement of his fraud action. According to the supreme
court the sums recovered were for personal economic loss
suffered by reason of the deceit. The court conceded, however, that had the buyer received the entire purchase price,
there would obviously have been unjust enrichment at the
lender's expense; since there was no allegation that the buyer
had settled for more than his own damages, the demurrer was
properly sustained.
The decision is not wholly convincing, to the extent the
result leaves the impression that the anti-deficiency statuteof questionable merit anyway-is being used not merely to
bar the purchase money lender from enforcing a deficiency,
but from asserting its proper prior claim to the security, or
substitute therefore, itself. Justice Mosk, the lone dissenter,
among all the appellate justices who reviewed the matter,
perceived this essential point: "This is not a suit upon a
secured debt, but a suit to prevent security from being impaired."! The anti-deficiency statute was irrelevant. In fact,
the express provision in the trust deed relating to the restoration of the property could likewise be irrelevant. If the bor20. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 580b.
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rower cannot impair the lender's security, he cannot pocket
a part of the fund which stands in place of the secured property in the face of the lender's prior claim thereto.
If the court in this case took a wrong turn, it was where it
assumed that the settlement received by the defendant-buyer
from the fraudulent seller was compensation for the buyer's
personal economic loss arising from the fraud rather than an
injury to the property. Granted that a fraud claim is "personal," the proposition still seems misleading. The deceit
directly affected the combined interests of lender and borrower
in property with respect to which the lender was given by
contract certain special protection. In lieu of the property
the seller was under a duty to make restitution of the purchase price or pay compensatory damages represented by the
difference between the purchase price and the actual value.
Any moneys advanced against either of these obligations clearly replaced the claimants' rights in the secured property. There
were no separate personal claims here, but only a single
property invasion claim with separate priorities. Since the
borrower's rights to such money was not "personal" to him,
his diversion of the substitute for the security was inconsistent
with the lender's priority. It follows that the lender had a prior
claim to any settlement by the seller with the buyer, until the
loan would be repaid. The anti-deficiency statute would corne
into play only to bar the lender from holding the borrower personally liable for any sum by which the settlement fell short
of the loan.
The possibility of unjust enrichment resulting from a settlement whose amount is unknown and from which the party
with a primary property claim is excluded is too strong to
leave the case dangling on a demurrer. Section 580b is a
bar to a deficiency decree, not a means to obtain unjust enrichment.
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Remedies for Mistake

Mistaken Boundaries
Relocation of a boundary line was achieved in Roman v.
Ries2 by a qualified decree in a quiet title suit. Defendant
had acquired property adjacent to that later acquired by
plaintiff. There was some doubt as to the boundary, defendant relying on the line pointed out by plaintiff's predecessor
who acquiesced in defendant's improvements up to the supposed line. Following plaintiff's acquisition it was discovered
that defendant's house was partially over the agreed boundary.
Plaintiff sued to quiet title, but judgment was entered for the
defendant under the doctrine of "agreed boundaries," which
in effect awarded him all the land up to the mistaken line.
On appeal, this decree was modified. It was pointed out that
the defendant had changed his position in reliance on the
"agreed boundary" with respect to only a part of the included
land and that the remaining portion should therefore be excluded and part of the boundary re-established along the true
line. The court admitted there was no precedent for a decree
which allows a party to benefit from part, but not all, of an
agreed boundary, but it held that such a decree is within the
flexible jurisdiction of an equity tribunal.
Mistake-Restitution
The court in E. A. Robey & Co. v. City Title Ins. Co. s applied the rule that a purchaser who has paid for, but has not
received, the entire amount called for in the contract, is entitled to keep what he has received and to have restitution
of his overpayment. 4 The rule is subject to the provision that
a fair basis for valuation can be found. Applied to the situation where there is a mistake as to the existence of a grantor's
title to a portion of the property, the remedy of partial restitution may prove a desirable alternative to rescission or to the
contract measure of damages stated in section 3306 of the
2. 259 Cal. App.2d 65,66 Cal. Rptr.
120 (1968).
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Civil Code, limiting recovery to the price paid and the expenses of examining title plus interest.
Mistake in Integration-Insurance Policy

An incontestibility clause does not bar an insurance company's remedy to reform a policy containing a clerical error.
So held the court in Schaefer v. California-Western States Life
Ins. Co. s
Remedies for Breach of Contract

Contracts for the Sale of Realty-Vendee in Default

After resolving a question as to whether a particular transaction was a license or sale and deciding in favor of the latter,
the court in Goetzke v. Hanks 6 held that the vendor had several
remedies but that unlawful detainer was not one of them.
The rule of Freedman v. Rector, etc. of St. Mathias Parish,7
allowing restitution in favor of a defaulting vendee for payments made beyond damages inflicted by the breach will not
be extended, according to the decision in Smith v. Allen,S to
allow restitution in favor of a defaulting grantee after a foreclosure of a purchase money trust deed by a sale at which the
grantor bids in the property. An opinion of the appellate
court to the contrary that would have seriously disrupted the
system of trust deed financing was thus overturned.
In Butcher v. Dauz,9 a vendee, awarded $6,000 damages
from a trial on a complaint for specific performance or damages, suffered a reversal on appeal because of his nonperformance of conditions. Retention of the award as restitution for
benefits conferred in attempting to perform could not be
asserted on appeal, because the complaint was framed solely
on damages for breach of contract, and the issue of' unjust
enrichment was not presented at trial.
5. 261 Cal. App.2d 840, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 183 (1968).
6. 261 Cal. App.2d 615, 68 Cal. Rptr.
150 (1968).
7. 37 Cal.2d 16, 230 P.2d 629, 31
A.L.R.2d 1 (1951).
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Vendee in Default-Specific Performance-Mutuality
The defense of want of mutuality of remedy was unsuccessfully asserted by a vendee to a suit for specific performance
in Landis v. Blomquist. 10 The contract called for part of the
purchase price to be in the form of a note secured by property,
acceptable to the vendor outside of the escrow. Defendant
failed to deposit such a note. The vendee's contention was
that because of the reservation by the vendor of the right of
approval of the security, the vendee could not have compelled
specific performance by the vendor (section 3386, Civil Code).
The primary reason for the court's rejection of the defense was
that the mutuality rule is not applicable where the unavailability of the remedy is the result of the defendant's own
omission. Also, the fact that the vendors instituted the present
suit cured any want of mutuality of obligation and placed
them within the jurisdiction of the court, so performance of
any protective conditions could be assured. The decision
indicates an unwillingness to indulge in an overly technical
application of the much criticized mutuality of remedy rule
III California.
Contracts for the Sale of Chattels-Damages-Lost
Profits
Applying the proposition tha damages based on a difference
between the contract price and the market price do not adequately compensate a known middleman, who is contemplating a profit, the court in Dulien Steel Products, Inc. v. A.
1. Industries, Inc. l1 awarded the plaintiff, a salvage operator
interested in dismantling the famous Alaska-Juneau mine
equipment for resale, damages based on lost profits.
The element of "lost net profits" was also prominent in
the determination of damages in Dallman Co. v. Southern
Heater CO. 12 The defendant, a manufacturer, agreed to sell
10.
Rptr.
11.
Rptr.
12.
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large quantities of hot water heaters bearing plaintiff's private
brand name to the plaintiff, a major plumbing distributor.
Much of the plaintiff's business was with housing developers; individual installations carried warranties to the purchaser of each home. The agreement also provided that the
defendant-manufacturer would establish and maintain a number of service facilities close to several of the plaintiff's places
of business in northern California. Defendant's failure of
performance inevitably caused homeowner dissatisfaction
which in turn caused the major subdividers and builders to
cease doing business with plaintiff. The complaint was for
loss of business profits and goodwill; it resulted in a judgment
for $262,870.
On appeal, among other objections, defendant contended
that the lower court entered a finding of fact that the damages
represented lost "net profits" and were thus inconsistent with
the claim for "loss of customers and business good will."
The appellate court refused to make any distinction between
the two. Another objection concerned the introduction of
evidence with regard to gross profits, coupled with testimony
of plaintiff's president that there was little change in overhead expenses such as salaries, accounting, rents and sales
costs after plaintiff's breach. Again the appellate court refused the objection. It cited several California cases holding
that, although gross profits are not generally recoverable in
breach of contract actions, in some circumstances, where
plaintiff can show his operating expenses are fixed and unaffected by the contract breach, his showing of diminished
gross profits is permissible since they are the equivalent of
the diminished net profits caused by the breach.
Contracts for the Sale of Stock-Specific Performance

A somewhat novel substitutional decree was entered in
Lister v. Sorge. 13 The plaintiff sought specific performance of
formed venture in the used car business.
The usual weakness of the evidence as
to lost profits where there has been no
past experience was one of the reasons
74
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a stock option offered by a management group to induce him,
as a former president, to return to active participation in the
business. During the pendency of the proceedings (which also
involved reformation of the option to include stock in a
subsidiary), the corporation sold all its assets. In lieu of the
stock subject to option defendant now held shares in another
corporation, plus some promissory notes received in the course
of the liquidation of the subsidiary. The court ordered the
substituted property transferred. Probably the circumstances
justified this admittedly unusual decree, although it might be
pointed out that the usual basis for equitable jurisdiction to
compel delivery of stock disappears when the specific stock is
not available.
Construction Contracts

In prolonged litigation the accumulation of claim items such
as costs, attorney's fees and interest may become as important
financially as compensatory damages themselves. Some guidelines as to these items were laid down in Distefano v. Hall,14
a case centering upon a dispute over the construction of a
22-unit apartment house in Santa Clara. The dispute resulted in two trials and a trip to the appellate court. Defenses
of fraud and faulty construction were vigorously presented.
The final judgment was $12,560 in favor of the plaintiff.
-

The Problem of Costs

To encourage settlements, section 997 of the Code of Civil
Procedure provides that a defendant may make an offer of
settlement any time before judgment. If not accepted, the
offer is considered withdrawn and cannot be introduced in
evidence. However, if the plaintiff refuses the offer and then
fails to obtain a more favorable judgment, he cannot recover
costs and must pay defendant's costs from the time of the
offer. In Distefano, defendant had made an offer of settlement for $20,000; since the judgment was for $12,560, he
14. 263 Cal. App.2d 380, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 691 (1968).
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argued that he should be awarded costs. However, the defendant had made a later offer of settlement for only $10,000.
Applying elementary contract law, the court held that the
later offer extinguished the prior one and therefore affirmed
denial of costs to the defendant.
-

The Problem of Attorneys' Fees

In Distefano, the plaintiff was awarded attorneys' fees under
the contract's boilerplate provision, that in case of suit, "the
losing party shall pay to the successful party . . , reasonable attorneys' fees.,,15 Defendant claimed such fees for himself pointing out that the plaintiff's original claim for $128,458
was scaled down to $39,382 by the second trial and resulted
in a judgment of only $12,560. Thus, on an absolute scale
the defendants were as successful as the plaintiff. The court
rejected this contention and held that the successful party
was the one with the net judgment, even if the other was, in
a sense, successful in securing a judgment on a counterclaim.
-

The Problem of Pre-Judgment Interest

Pre-judgment interest is recoverable when the sum due is ascertained or ascertainable. 16 Plaintiff cited authority that the
sum is ascertainable if a plaintiff has furnished a defendant
with data from which the amount due can be calculated, even
allowing for disputes as to agreed price. Plaintiff asserted that
ten years earlier he had turned over all payroll receipts, invoices, and cancelled checks in his possession. The court,
however, held that the mere fact that defendant was given such
data was not enough to impose pre-judgment interest; major
issues of law as well as fact could be determined only by
trial. This conclusion suggests that pre-judgment interest
allowance remains largely a matter of judicial discretion but
that the award depends less on the precision of factual data
available than on the complexity of the legal issues presented.
15. 263 Cal. App.2d at 385, 69 Cal.
Rptr. at 695-696.
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Contracts for Services-Real Estate Brokers

How exclusive is an "exclusive and irrevocable listing" with
a real estate agent? Not very, if the agent fails to produce
"lookers." In such event the owner is entitled to rescind or
cancel the listing for failure of consideration, according to
Coleman v. Mora. 17 Under the circumstances it was deemed
unnecessary to distinguish between an "exclusive agency"
and an "exclusive right to sell," since the property was promptly resold through another agent rather than by the owner him"elf.
Contracts of Guaranty-Effect of Anti-Deficiency Statute

A lender whose action against the borrower on a secured
note is affected by anti-deficiency legislation may gain an
additional remedy by having the note guaranteed by a third
party. This device has certain limitations as indicated in
Union Bank v. Gradsky,I8 wherein the lender first held a nonjudicial sale of the security and then sued the guarantor of
the note for the deficiency. It was held that by electing to
proceed in this fashion, the lender had destroyed the guarantor's right of subrogation against the principal obligor, and his
remedy against the guarantor on the note was barred.
Contracts to Insure-Breach of Agreement to Obtain
Insurance

Subrogation principles also have an effect upon available
remedies against one who has broken a contract to obtain
insurance covering a loss subsequently incurred by the plaintiff.
It is generally held in the United States that an insurer may
not have subrogation to contract claims that the insured might
otherwise assert to obtain reimbursement for his loss. This
rule is simply the other side of the coin expressing the rule
which considers collateral sources in fixing compensatory
17. 263 Cal. App.2d 137, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 166 (1968).
18. 265 Cal. App.2d - , 71 Cal. Rptr.

64 (1968). For further discussion of
this case, see Lazerow, REAL PROPERTY,
in this volume.
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damages. Application of these principles determined the
outcome in Patent Scaffolding Co. v. William Simpson Construction Co.l9 The general contractor (Simpson) agreed to
obtain fire insurance covering the subcontractor's (Patent)
work and materials at the job site. Simpson broke the contract. Fire loss occurred and Patent's own insurers paid.
The present action was brought nominally by Patent for
breach of contract, but it was openly stated that the genuine
plaintiffs were Patent's insurers. Judgment given in favor of
Patent was reversed on appeal. It was reasoned that, since
Patent had already received payment for its loss, it sustained
no damage by reason of defendant's breach of contract and
that there was consequently no cause of action. In other
words, Patent's insurers were not subrogated to the claim
for breach of contract. The payment by one of two parties
contractually bound to indemnify does not create a superior
equity in favor of the paying as against the non-paying indemnitor so as to create an equitable right of subrogation for
unjust enrichment.
Stated conversely in terms of the "collateral source" doctrine, the result here was that a tortfeasor is not entitled to
credit for a property insurer's payment of a loss to the plaintiff, but that a contract breaker who fails to provide the
agreed protection against fire loss is entitled to the benefit of
the plaintiff's fire insurance.
Remedies on Contracts Nominally Unenforceable Because of
the Statute of Frauds

In California, the doctrine of estoppel to assert the statute
of frauds is routinely employed to allow recovery of damages
for breach of contract, as well as the remedies of restitution or
specific performance in equity to which a plaintiff may be
limited in less permissive jurisdictions. 20 However, this estoppel is not created by a mere promise to put the contract
19. 256 Cal. App.2d 506, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 187 (1967).
20. E.g., Dallman Co. v. Southern
Heater Co., 262 Cal. App.2d 582, 68
78
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in writing. 1 Also, as to certain agreements (notably that of
employment of brokers in real estate sales) the contract is
absolutely unenforceable unless in writing; not even a quasicontractual remedy for the reasonable value of the services
rendered in reliance on the oral agreement is maintainable. 2
In Porporato v. Devincenzi,3 a typical case of an oral
agreement to devise realty, the plaintiff successfully pursued
the remedy of quasi-specific performance in lieu of the remedies of restitution or damages.
1. Tomlins v. American Insurance
Co., 258 Cal. App.2d 525, 66 Cal. Rptr.
n (1968).
2. Wm. E. Doud & Co. v. Smith,

256 Cal. App.2d 552, 64 Cal. Rptr.
222 (1967).
3. 261 Cal. App.2d 670, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 210 (1968).
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